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OFTEN WRONG, NEVER IN DOUBT: HOW ANTIARBITRATION EXPECTANCY BIAS MAY LIMIT
ACCESS TO JUSTICE
Becky L. Jacobs*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is an honor to be a part of the Maine Law Review’s “Accessing Justice in
Hard Times: Lessons from the Field, Looking to the Future” symposium issue. Not
only is the symposium’s theme particularly relevant in our current economic
environment, it also provides those of us in the “Alternative Dispute Resolution”
(ADR)1 field with an opportunity to reflect upon and return to the roots of our
movement and to advance our cause and encourage others to join us.
While there long have been “alternatives” to the traditional trial for those
seeking to resolve disputes,2 the so-called “litigation explosion”3 in the 1970s
inspired a campaign for reform of the administration of justice that resulted in the
modern ADR movement. The movement had many disparate goals, not the least of
which was to improve public access to justice.4 At the historic 1976 National
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice (Pound Conference), Harvard Law Professor Frank E.A. Sander first
posited the concept of a “comprehensive justice center,” more famously referred to
as a “multi-door courthouse,”5 in which a grievant’s dispute would be evaluated
then directed to the most appropriate process or sequence of processes.6 “Room 3”
in Professor Sander’s Multi-Door Courthouse/Dispute Resolution Center was listed
in the lobby’s directory as Arbitration,7 the alternative process on which this
Article will focus.
The question that I pose herein is whether popular (mis)conceptions about
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. The Author may be
contacted at jacobs@utk.edu.
1. “Alternative Dispute Resolution” is a phrase most commonly associated with the acronym
“ADR.” There are those, however, who have suggested that the more accurate phrase might be
“Appropriate Dispute Resolution,” a more inclusive phrase that describes the full panoply of dispute
resolution options, including litigation. See, e.g., LEONARD L. RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND
LAWYERS 20-21 (4th ed. 2009); DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 17-20 (Douglas H. Yarn ed.,
1999).
2. For a survey of just a few of these methods, see STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 6-7 (5th ed. 2007).
3. See Thomas O. Main, ADR: The New Equity, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 329, 333 (2005).
4. See generally id. at 333 n.12 (citing, inter alia, Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, Access to
Justice: The Newest Wave in the Worldwide Movement to Make Rights Effective, 27 BUFF. L. REV. 181
(1978); Russell G. Pearce et al., An Assessment of Alternative Strategies for Increasing Access to Legal
Services, 90 YALE L.J. 122 (1980); BARBARA A. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: THE
FINAL REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURVEY (1977); Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 905, 906 (1979).
5. See A Dialogue between Professors Frank Sander and Mariana Hernandez Crespo Exploring
the Evolution of the Multi-Door Courthouse, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 665, 665-67 (2008).
6. Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE:
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 64, 83-84 (A. Leo Levin and Russell Wheeler eds., 1979).
7. Sander, supra note 6.
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arbitration may actually be preventing some of those who are most in need from
receiving the legal relief they seek. Before I reflect upon that query, however, a bit
of background may be in order.
II. ARBITRATION: THE PROCESS AND ITS PROGRESS
Arbitration is a “method of dispute resolution involving one or more neutral
third parties who are usu[ally] agreed to by the disputing parties and whose
decision is binding.”8 The process has a storied historical pedigree, both in the
United States and internationally. Most people associate arbitration with the
Judgment of Solomon, a reference to the biblical account of King Solomon’s
decision to “split the baby” with a sword to settle a dispute between two women
claiming to be the child’s mother.9 Ancient civilizations such as the Greek and
Roman empires utilized arbitration to settle internal and external disagreements.10
It also became popular in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries for specialized
industries to resolve intra-industry disputes with arbitration.11
However, while parties, industries, and nations have incorporated arbitration
into their dispute resolution practices, courts were not always as receptive to the
process.12 The conventional wisdom13 is that American courts, like their British
common law counterparts, were hostile to arbitration agreements and were
reluctant to enforce them.14
An oft-quoted passage by Justice Story is
representative of this period of judicial hostility:
One of the established principles of courts of equity is, not to entertain a bill for
the specific performance of any agreement, where it is doubtful whether it may not
thereby become the instrument of injustice, or to deprive parties of rights which
they are otherwise fairly entitled to have protected. . . . Now we all know, that
arbitrators, at the common law, . . . are not ordinarily well enough acquainted with
the principles of law or equity, to administer either effectually, in complicated
cases . . . . Ought then a court of equity to compel a resort to such a tribunal, by
which, however honest and intelligent, it can in no case be clear that the real legal
15
or equitable rights of the parties can be fully ascertained or perfectly protected?

New York was the first state to enact legislation to counter this perceived

8. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 112 (8th ed. 2004).
9. 1 Kings 3:16-28.
10. See ROBERT V. MASSEY, JR., W. VA. UNIV. EXTENSION SERV., INST. FOR LABOR STUDIES &
RESEARCH, HISTORY OF ARBITRATION AND GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 2,
available at http:// www.wvu.edu/~exten/depts/ilsr/arbitration_history.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
11. Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of Arbitration, 74 TUL.
L. REV. 39, 43 (1999).
12. See, e.g., Richard C. Rueben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577, 599-601 (1997).
13. Some scholars have questioned the widely-espoused notion of judicial hostility to arbitration.
See, e.g., Michael H. LeRoy, Misguided Fairness? Regulating Arbitration by Statute: Empirical
Evidence of Declining Award Finality, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 551, 558-60 (2008).
14. Rueben, supra note 12, at 599-601.
15. Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (D. Mass. 1845).
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judicial hostility,16 and the United States Congress followed shortly with the
Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA).17 The FAA was the expression of “a
national policy favoring arbitration,”18 and it mandated enforcement of parties’ predispute agreements to arbitrate.19 Pursuant to the FAA, Congress limited the role
of the judiciary in the merits of contractually-agreed arbitration matters.20 The
FAA served as the model for the Uniform Arbitration Act, promulgated in 1955 by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)21
and enacted in some form or in its revised form in nearly every state in the nation.22
Following the enactment of these affirmatory legislative developments and
following a series of United States Supreme Court cases that expanded the scope of
the FAA,23 arbitration clauses requiring that parties submit their disputes to binding
arbitration became customary in contracts in a broad spectrum of settings. For
example, standard consumer contracts for credit cards and other consumer loans,
product purchases, real estate, construction, utilities, auto and home insurance, and
health care contain mandatory arbitration clauses.24 Sherman Act antitrust claims
are arbitrable,25 as are disputes between and among investors, securities firms, and

16. 1920 N.Y. Laws 36. See John R. Allison, Arbitration of Private Antitrust Claims in
International Trade: A Study in the Subordination of National Interests to the Demands of a World
Market, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 361, 371 (1986).
17. United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (current version at 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 116 (1999 & Supp. 2008)).
18. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). See also Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
19. See § 2, 43 Stat. at 883.
20. See Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration’s Finality Through Functional
Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 165 (2002).
21. Maureen A. Weston, Preserving the Federal Arbitration Act by Reining in Judicial Expansion
and Mandatory Use, 8 NEV. L.J. 385, 388-89 (2007).
22. See Stanley A. Leasure & Kent P. Ragan, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims: Patient’s
Dilemma and Doctor’s Delight?, 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 51, 56 & n.38, 41 (2009). Twenty-eight states and
the District of Columbia have adopted the UAA, or some version thereof. Id. at 56. “The following
states have adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act of 1956: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming.” Id. at 56 n.38. Thirteen states have chosen the Revised
Uniform Arbitration Act: Alaska, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Nevada, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. Uniform Law
Commissioners, A Few Facts About the Uniform Arbitration Act (2000), available at
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-aa.asp (last visited Jan. 23, 2010).
23. See, e.g., Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52 (2003); Howsam v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468 (1989); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985);
Southland, 465 U.S. 1.
24. See generally Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration's Summer
Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 871 (2008); Mark Furletti, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA,
MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY (2003), available at
http://www.phil.frb.org/payment-cardscenter/events/workshops/2003/MandatoryArbitrationClauses_012003.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
25. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 616, 640.
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individual investment advisors.26 Franchise contracts also frequently demand that
disputes be resolved by arbitration.27
In the workplace, mandatory pre-dispute resolution clauses often require that
employees submit all claims arising from or related to their employment to
compulsory arbitration, including statutory discrimination claims.28 In unionized
workplace environments, arbitration has long been a fixture in dispute processing.29
Collective bargaining agreements specify multi-step grievance procedures to
resolve disputes, the vast majority of which culminate in binding arbitration.30
Non-union employees also have been required by their employers to sign contracts
containing pre-dispute arbitration clauses as a condition of their employment.31
In spite, or perhaps because, of its pervasiveness, however, arbitration has
become the focus of renewed hostility in the public, in courts, and in legislatures.

26. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) is the largest independent regulator for
U.S. securities firms. Its website states that it “operates the largest dispute resolution forum in the
securities industry to assist in the resolution of monetary and business disputes between and among
investors, securities firms and individual registered representatives.” FINRA – Arbitation & Mediation,
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/index.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2010). See also Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (pre-dispute arbitration agreement for
claims under the Securities Act of 1933 held to be enforceable); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (arbitration agreement for claims brought under section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 held to be enforceable); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506
(1974) (agreement to arbitrate disputes from international commercial transactions held to be
enforceable).
27. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Clauses in Franchise Agreements: Common (and
Uncommon) Terms, 22 FRANCHISE L.J. 81, 81 (2002).
28. See Leona Green, Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes: A Public Policy
Issue in Need of a Legislative Solution, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 173, 173 (1998). In
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991), the United States Supreme Court held
that an employee's age discrimination claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA) was subject to mandatory arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause set forth in the
employee's New York Stock Exchange registration application. This holding has been expanded to
require arbitration of employee federal discrimination claims pursuant to Title VII, section 1981, of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, and various other anti-discrimination laws, including the Equal Pay
Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. Steven M. Warshawsky, Gilmer, the
Contractual Exhaustion Doctrine, and Federal Statutory Employment Discrimination Claims, 19 LAB.
LAW. 285, 294-95 & nn.79-85 (2004). “Indeed, it is now well-established that all federal laws
prohibiting workplace discrimination may be the subject of compulsory arbitration agreements.” Id. at
295.
29. Arbitration clauses contained in collective bargaining labor agreements were held enforceable
pursuant to section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (29 U.S.C. § 185 (1998))
(LMRA), rather than the FAA. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S.
448, 456 (1957). See also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960). The United States
Supreme Court recently confirmed that statutory discrimination claims submitted to arbitration by
parties to a collective bargaining agreement are arbitrable. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456,
1461 (2009).
30. See generally Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law
Exile: Problems with Its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 204950 (2009).
31. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Building the Civilization of Arbitration: Introduction, 113 PENN
ST. L. REV. 983, 983-84 (2009).
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This dissatisfaction with the process is not new; opponents of arbitration have
lobbied for changes to the FAA or for “reform” legislation for many years. These
efforts have been focused on so-called “mandatory”32 pre-dispute arbitration
agreements in contracts between parties with unequal bargaining power, for
example, employment and franchising agreements and those for consumer goods
and services.33
Reform legislation generally prohibiting enforcement of mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in the context of all employment discrimination and other
federal employment statutory claims has been proposed,34 as have bills that would
specifically amend a number of federal civil rights statutes to preclude the
enforcement of pre-mandatory arbitration provisions in pre-dispute agreements
relating to claims arising under these statutes.35 Courts also have begun to more
aggressively review arbitration agreements, using concepts such as
unconscionability or public policy to refuse to enforce mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration clauses.36
These efforts to limit or restrict the imposition of mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration, however, have been “largely perfunctory.”37 It is only recently that
they have gained traction, attributable, some have opined, to the composition of the
new administration.38 As one Commentator so poetically described, “What
otherwise might have been a tempest in a teacup has grown into a full fledged
tornado.”39 Fueled by the rising tide of public anger in the wake of the economic
crisis, opponents of arbitration forcefully have made their case, arguing, among

32. Some find the adjective “mandatory” to be inaccurate:
What [others] call[ ] mandatory arbitration is better called contractual arbitration because
it, unlike some other arbitration, does not occur unless the parties to the arbitration have
previously formed a contract stating their agreement to arbitrate the dispute. Arbitration
is not mandatory when it arises out of a contract, because contracts are formed
voluntarily. The rare cases in which consent to a contract is involuntary—as when “A
grasps B's hand and compels B by physical force to write his name” to the signature line
of a contract, or when A puts a gun to B's head and says “sign or I'll shoot”—result in
contracts that are voidable on the ground of duress. In the absence of duress, it is
inaccurate, as well as overly dramatic, to say that a contract containing an arbitration
clause results in arbitration that is involuntary or mandatory.
Stephen J. Ware, Contractual Arbitration, Mandatory Arbitration, and State Constitutional Jury-Trial
Rights, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 41 (2003) (footnotes omitted). But see Jean R. Sternlight, In Defense of
Mandatory Binding Arbitration (If Imposed on the Company), 8 NEV. L.J. 82, 82 n.1 (2007).
33. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 32, at 82-84.
34. Civil Rights Act of 2008, H.R. 5129, S. 2554, 110th Cong. § 423 (2008).
35. See Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 1489, S. 163, 107th Cong. (2001)
(amending, inter alia, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993).
36. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of
Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 757, 760-62 (2004).
37. Carbonneau, supra note 31, at 984.
38. Id.
39. Sandra D. Grannum, Securities Arbitration in the Market Meltdown Era: Achieving Fairness in
Perception and Reality: The Faith and Face of Securities Arbitration After the 2008 Crash, 1754 PRAC.
L. INST./CORP 111, 116 (2009).
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other negative consequences, that mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in
“adhesion” consumer product and services contracts and employment agreements
are not the product of voluntary bargaining; that private arbitration is not a proper
forum for the resolution of disputes implicating important civil rights; that
arbitration requires individuals to surrender their right to a jury trial; and that
arbitrators are captive to “repeat players” and produce unfair results.40
The first proposal in response to this highly publicized anti-arbitration
campaign was the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007,41 a “radical” amendment to the
Federal Arbitration Act that would virtually eliminate the binding effect of predispute arbitration clauses in contracts involving consumers, employees, and, to
some degree, franchisees.42 More recently, two other proposals have surfaced. The
first, the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 (AFA), would render pre-dispute
arbitration agreements unenforceable for “an employment, consumer, or franchise
dispute[,]” or “a dispute arising under any statute intended to protect civil rights.”43
The second, the Consumer Fairness Act of 2009, would make pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in consumer contracts unenforceable as “an unfair and
deceptive trade act or practice.”44
Who could argue against such reforms, one might ask? “As the bill’s title suggests,
this reform movement is ultimately about fairness, and who can be against fairness?”45
Most certainly, these concerns not only are valid, but also are, on the whole I
believe, well-intentioned,46 and it seemingly has been difficult for arbitration’s defenders
to mount an effective rebuttal without appearing to be out to get the “little guy”47 and to

40. See, e.g., Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can Be Against Fairness? The Case Against the Arbitration
Fairness Act, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 267, 267 (2008); Recent Proposed Legislation,
Arbitration—Congress Considers Bill to Invalidate Pre-Dispute Arbitration Clauses for Consumers,
Employees, and Franchisees—Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007), 121
HARV. L. REV. 2262, 2264-65 (2008).
41. S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007).
42. See Rutledge, supra note 40, at 267-68.
43. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009).
44. Consumer Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 991, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009).
45. Rutledge, supra note 40, at 267.
46. But see Carbonneau, supra note 31, at 984-85. Professor Carbonneau asserts that some
arguments posited by anti-arbitration advocates are disingenuous:
[T]he anti-arbitration sentiment in the U.S. Congress has been fueled and financed by the
American Trial Lawyers' Association (ATLA) and encouraged by other lobbyist groups,
like Public Citizen. While all the opponents of arbitration pay reverence to the
Constitution and to the sanctity of legal rights, . . . [and] a proclaimed concern for
disadvantaged parties and their plight in society[,] . . . [t]he virulence of the critics is
motivated by the need to control the measure and implementation of the rule of law; it is
not a concern about the rule of law itself. In the final analysis, the interests of the average
citizen are irrelevant; what is truly important is who decides how society is governed and
who controls the administration of justice.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
47. Professor Jean R. Sternlight has used the phrase “little guys” to describe “consumers, lower
level employees, and perhaps certain franchisees and small businesses that could not be expected to
knowingly and voluntarily negotiate arbitration clauses in advance.” Sternlight, supra note 32, at 82 n.3
(citing Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for
Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. QUARTERLY. 637, 637-39 (1996)).
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be wholly biased in favor of “big business.”48 Yet, one must ask whether these very
passionate anti-arbitration claims are as clear cut as those making them would have the
public believe. Are they supported by overwhelmingly irrefutable data demonstrating
the nefariously inflicted harm to the “little guys” that the legislation is designed to
protect?
III. ARBITRATION: THE PERCEPTION
To be clear, I am not advocating for or against the reforms embodied in the
AFA. However, I would like to take a step back from the inflammatory rhetoric49
with which we all are being bombarded and consider whether at least some of the
arbitration reform advocacy may be based upon the expectancy bias of the
advocates. In psychology and cognitive science, expectancy bias, a form of
confirmation or confirmatory bias, is the tendency to search for or interpret data in
such a way that supports one’s preconceptions, beliefs, expectations, or hypotheses
and to discount information that would disconfirm these existing opinions.50
Studies indicate that the public generally has a strongly negative opinion of
arbitration and perceives it to be an unfair process.51 Yet, this perception does not
appear to be unequivocally supported by available empirical data on arbitral
results52 across a variety of subject matter disputes53 and disputants, including those
involving consumers,54 individual investors,55 and employees.56
48. Cf. Sternlight, supra note 32, at 83-84.
49. Consider, for example, the language of Public Citizen’s advocacy: “Forced arbitration creates a
systemic bias in favor of businesses while offering few, if any, meaningful deterrents against negligence
or even foul play.” ZACHARY GIMA ET AL., PUBLIC CITIZEN, FORCED ARBITRATION: UNFAIR AND
EVERYWHERE 4 (2009), http://www.citizen.org/documents/UnfairAndEverywhere.pdf [hereinafter
PUBLIC CITIZEN, FORCED ARBITRATION].
50. See generally Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many
Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998). See also Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The
Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 309-16.
51. See Sarah Rudolph Cole & Theodore H. Frank, The Current State of Consumer Arbitration, 15
DISP. RESOL. MAG. 30, 33 (2008). But see Peter B. Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 549, 560-62 (2008) (surveys of actual participants in arbitral proceedings across a variety of
industries report positive attitudes about the process and its fairness).
52. This Author does not purport to engage in a thorough evaluation of these data, and an
exhaustive analysis thereof is beyond the scope of this Article. As the prominent arbitration scholar
Professor Peter B. Rutledge has opined, a meaningful analysis of whether arbitration produces “good”
results really involves two distinct inquiries. First, how should arbitral outcomes be measured? Once
this normative question is resolved, the second question is: What do the data reveal? Email from Peter
B. Rutledge, Associate Professor, Univ. of Ga. Law School, to Becky L. Jacobs, Associate Professor,
Univ. of Tennessee College of Law (Oct. 26, 2009) (on file with author). My brief discussion conflates
these two inquiries, as do many of the available data analyses on arbitral results. This is not a merely
academic issue. Not only may expectancy bias influence data interpretation, it also can creep into study
design, and it hampers an intelligent and coherent public debate on arbitration’s future.
53. See generally Rutledge, supra note 51.
54. See Cole & Frank, supra note 51, at 33.
55. See JILL I. GROSS & BARBARA BLACK , UNIV. OF CINCINNATI COLLEGE OF LAW, PERCEPTIONS
FAIRNESS OF SECURITIES ARBITRATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 59 (2008),
OF
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1090969 (last visited Jan. 23, 2010).
56. See Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration Reform: What We Know and What We Need To Know, 10
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 579, 582-83 (2009).
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Consider consumer debt arbitrations, the focus of much recent controversy and
study. A widely-cited report by the advocacy group Public Citizen concluded that
arbitrators in consumer debt arbitrations are “[b]iased decision-makers” who
essentially “rubber-stamp[] corporate claims” and produce “[s]tunning results that
disfavor consumers” in 94 percent of cases.57 However, critical analysis of the data
presented by Public Citizen to support these conclusions yielded a far different set
of statistics, reporting that “consumers had at least partial success in 48.5 percent of
the cases in Public Citizen’s data set, a far cry from the [one-sided] business
success rate portrayed in Public Citizen’s report.”58 Other data examination
support the conclusion that Public Citizen’s report misleadingly overstates the
situation,59 including one analysis of 2006 consumer-filed cases administered by
the American Arbitration Association (AAA) that calculated an 81 percent
favorable outcome for the consumer through either an outright winning award or a
voluntary settlement.60
These success rates compare favorably to results in consumer litigation.
Comparative data demonstrate that consumers bringing arbitration claims against
businesses prevail in 65.5 percent of cases that reach a decision, and the median
duration from initial filing to final disposition is 4.35 months.61 In court, buyer
plaintiffs litigating contract claims prevailed 61.5 percent of the time, 60.9 percent
in cases decided by bench trials, and with a median “filing to final” duration of
19.4 months.62
In securities arbitration, the disparity between perception and “reality” also
appears to be prevalent. While investors held strongly negative perceptions of both
the arbitration process and of the bias of arbitrators before they even filed a claim
leading to arbitration,63 analyses of securities arbitral awards provide that, in 2009,
investors were awarded damages in 45 percent of cases.64 According to these data,
investors received a monetary or non-monetary recovery in approximately 70
percent of customer claimant cases, through settlements or awards.65 Attempting to
compare arbitral and judicial win/loss results in the securities context is difficult for
a number of reasons. These reasons include (1) the differences between the
57. JOHN O’DONNELL, PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION TRAP: HOW CREDIT CARD COMPANIES
ENSNARE CONSUMERS 2, 12 (2007), http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7545 (last
visited Jan. 23, 2010).
58. Cole & Frank, supra note 51, at 32.
59. See SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, CONSUMER ARBITRATION BEFORE THE AMERICAN
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 109-13 (2009); Cole & Frank, supra note 51, at 31-34.
60. The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007: Hearing on S. 1782 Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 124 (2007) (statement of Richard Naimark, Senior Vice
President, American Arbitration Association) [hereinafter Statement of Richard Naimark].
61. Mark Fellows, The Same Result as in Court, More Efficiently: Comparing Arbitration and
Court
Litigation
Outcomes,
Metro.
Corp.
Couns.,
July
1,
2006
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/current.php?artType=view&artMonth=July&artYear=2006&EntryN
o=5325 (last visited Jan. 23, 2010).
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63. Jill I. Gross & Barbara Black, When Perception Changes Reality: An Empirical Study of
Investors' Views of the Fairness of Securities Arbitration, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 349, 389-91 (2008).
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http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/AboutFINRADR/Statistics/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
65. Id.
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arbitration and litigation processes, (2) the limited number of retail investor cases
decided through litigation, and (3) the data that demonstrate that 25 percent of all
investor claims are for less than $10,000 and, therefore, not cost effective to
litigate.66 However, one older study reported that an average of 60 percent of
investors received an award in securities arbitration; 39 percent of investors
received favorable results in the very few cases that were decided in court.67
Employment cases follow this same expectancy bias pattern. While many
believe that “[f]orced arbitration clauses effectively allow employers to shield
themselves from the purview [of] employment laws,”68 the data once again do not
conclusively support this contention. Data analysis of all of the employment cases
administered by the AAA in 2006 yielded a 77 percent success rate for
employees.69 While studies of other data sets yielded lower rates,70 the aggregate
arbitral data71 compare favorably to the litigation alternative.72 A study by the
National Workrights Institute reported that, overall, employees prevailed 62
percent of the time in arbitration, while they had a 43 percent win rate in court.73
While you know what they say about statistics,74 and about how reactive
devaluation might impact what they say about these statistics,75 these data do
suggest that expectancy bias plays at least some role in the overwhelmingly
negative perception that many have of the arbitration process.

66. See Steven B. Caruso, Sunshine May Be the Best Disinfectant for What Ails Securities
Arbitration: A Discussion of the 2008 SICA Empirical Study of Fairness, 1685 PRAC. L. INST./CORP.
233, 260 (2008); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., SECURITIES ARBITRATION: HOW INVESTORS FARE 6 (1992)
[hereinafter 1992 GAO Report].
67. 1992 GAO Report, supra note 66, at 35, 49.
68. Fair Arbitration Now, Employment Arbitration, http://www.fairarbitrationnow.org/content/
employment-arbitration (last visited Jan. 23, 2010).
69. Statement of Richard Naimark, supra note 60, at 124.
70. Studies demonstrate that employee win rates in all fora, both judicial and arbitral, are highly
dependent upon the legal theory of the claim and were much lower when the case involved a violation of
a civil rights statute. Lewis L. Maltby, Employment Arbitration and Workplace Justice, 38 U.S.F. L.
REV. 105, 111 (2003).
71. Low-income employees appear to have much lower success rates in arbitration than higher
earners. Rutledge, supra note 56, at 583.
72. Id. at 582-83.
73. THE NATIONAL WORKRIGHTS INSTITUTE, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION: WHAT DOES THE DATA
SHOW?, http://www.workrights.org/current/cd_ arbitration.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2010).
74. “Figures often beguile me, particularly when I have the arranging of them myself; in which case
the remark attributed to Disraeli would often apply with justice and force: ‘There are three kinds of lies:
lies, damned lies, and statistics.’” MARK TWAIN'S OWN AUTOBIOGRAPHY: THE CHAPTERS FROM THE
NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW 185 (Michael J. Kiskis ed., 1990). For a critique of the value of “win rate”
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75. “Reactive evaluation,” also sometimes referred to as source devaluation or opposition bias, is a
psychological process by which information is devalued, discounted or ignored, or perceived as
inaccurate simply because it was proposed or produced by an “opponent.” See Lee Ross, Reactive
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(Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995).

2010]

ANTI-ARBITRATION BIAS

541

IV. CONCLUSION
Regardless of the “objective” reality of the fairness or lack thereof of
arbitration, negative perceptions of the process already are “transform[ing] the
reality faced by policy-makers”76 and influencing the development of the law
regarding arbitration. For example, the AAA no longer will accept certain new
consumer debt collection arbitration filings,77 and, as part of a settlement with the
Office of the Minnesota Attorney General, the National Arbitration Forum will stop
accepting or participating in the processing or administration of any new consumer
arbitrations.78 Additionally, Bank of America and J.P. Morgan Chase have
dropped mandatory arbitration for credit card customers, and, in Bank of America’s
case, for bank account holders.79 Other credit card companies, such as American
Express, have indicated that they are monitoring their arbitration practices.80
While anti-arbitration advocates cheer these developments and continue their
campaigns to further restrict the use of arbitration, others predict that limiting
access to arbitration may in some instances be limiting access to justice for many
claimants, in many settings.81 Consumers and employees with modest financial
claims may find it impossible to afford or locate counsel willing to represent them,
and they may not have the time or funding for lengthy court proceedings.82
Furthermore, even if arbitration remains a viable dispute resolution option, negative
public expectancy bias may prevent consumers, employees, and other similar
disputants from even considering its use.
As Voltaire warned, perfect is the enemy of good, and, in this situation, a
favorable result in a “good” process for a consumer, employee, or franchisee may
be infinitely better than little or no recourse at all.83 If prohibitions or sweeping
restrictions on pre-dispute arbitral requirements have even the potential to harm the
very parties that anti-arbitration advocates claim to be seeking to protect, must
reform be an all or nothing proposition? Even its most staunch and persistent
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Jan. 23, 2010).
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80. Id.
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critics do not recommend that arbitration be abandoned under all circumstances.84
The process for reform should model the very values that arbitral reformists claim
to seek and should provide an objective, unbiased, and deliberate evaluation of all
available data, regardless of its source. Decision-makers should eschew, even
denounce, the polemic rhetoric lest it reinforce any public negative expectancy bias
and potentially deny access to justice to those most in need.

84. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 32, at 105-06.

